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Abstract
This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial
delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many
modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based
on the profit and sales of each firm and the delegation game with bargaining in two types of
differentiated-products duopolistic competition wherein each firm's manager chooses his or
her own output or price. We show that in equilibrium, the profit of each firm decreases,
whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increase as the relative bargaining power of
the managers increases in both quantity and price competitions. Thus, we find that similar to
the case of the quantity competition wherein both firms produce homogeneous goods in
Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), the managerial power of managers is positively associated with
social welfare.
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This paper presents a theoretical analysis of bargaining on managerial delegation between owner-
shareholders and managers in a diﬀerentiated-products market. Modern corporate governance
codes includes clauses retiring the disclosure of managerial compensation in order to protect
owner-shareholders against the opportunistic behavior of managers. This paper aims to ex-
plain the eﬀects of managerial power and the disclosure of managerial compensation on market
outcomes in the case wherein each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated good.
A theoretical analysis of the separation of ownership and management challenges the va-
lidity of the traditional assumption of a ﬁrm as the sole proﬁt maximizing agent. With the
development of a principal-agent model, studies have been conducted to clarify the interaction
between owner-manager contracts and market behavior in the context of an oligopolistic indus-
try with managerial delegation. In their well-known articles, Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987) revealed that proﬁt-maximizing owners sometimes choose to divert the preference
of their managers away from proﬁt maximization. They investigated a two-stage duopolistic
game where in the ﬁrst stage, each proﬁt-maximizing owner chooses a compensation scheme for
his or her manager that is a linear combination of proﬁt and sales. Based on the two semi-
nal works, the literature on delegation games extended its scope to alternative compensation
schemes. Salas Fumas (1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2002) considered the compensation scheme
as a linear combination of the proﬁt of a ﬁrm and its rival. Jansen et al. (2007) investigated the
case in which each manager’s remuneration is a weighted sum of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and market
share.
Another major branch of the literature on managerial delegation considers bargaining is-
sues between an owner and a manager in various environments. Since the pioneering work by
Fershtman (1985), this type of model has particularly focused on wage bargaining. Szyman-
ski (1994) and Bughin (1995) analyzed the inﬂuence of the delegation of wage bargaining with
unions to managers on product market competition, depending on the type of the managerial
compensation scheme. Along the lines of these works, Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) considered
the bargaining between owners and managers over their compensation contracts, in order to
explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes.
More precisely, they analyzed the two-stage duopolistic game where in the ﬁrst stage owners
negotiate with their managers over managerial delegation contracts. Subsequently, in the second
stage, Cournot competition with a homogeneous good is observed.
The main purpose of this paper is to expand the scope of the results of Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) with respect to the sales delegation case to those of a diﬀerentiated-products duopolistic
game. In this paper, the game operates in the same manner as that in Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007). However, we investigate both Cournot and Bertrand competitions. In short, we extend
the scope of the strategic managerial delegation model with bargaining between owners and
managers by considering both product diﬀerentiation and the change in ﬁrms’ strategic variables.
Through these analyses, we intend to determine whether or not the results of Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) of the sales delegation is robust against a change(s) in the degree of product diﬀerentiation
and/or the ﬁrms’ strategic variables. We obtain the result that competition is promoted in
both Cournot and Bertrand fashions irrespective of the degree of product diﬀerentiation, as
1the relative bargaining power of the manager increases. Thus, in the context of a symmetric
duopolistic competition with bargaining between owners and managers, we ﬁnd that the results
of Cournot competition with homogeneous goods are robust against the changes in the degree
of product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrms’ (managers’) strategic variables.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic
setting of the delegation game of the two types of models considered in this paper. In Section
3, we consider the case of quantity competition. In Section 4, we investigate the case of price
competition. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a symmetric duopolistic model using a standard product diﬀerentiation model as
in Singh and Vives (1984). A representative consumer’s utility is denoted as









where qi represents the quantity of good i (= 1;2), and b 2 (0;1) represents the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. Note that q denotes a numeraire good. The utility function generates
the system of linear demand functions:
qi =
a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj
1 ¡ b2 ; b 2 (0;1); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Then, the inverse demand functions can be inverted to obtain
pi = a ¡ qi ¡ bqj; b 2 (0;1); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j;
where pi represents the price of good i (= 1;2). We assume that both the ﬁrms have constant
marginal costs of production, c(< a). The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = (a ¡ qi ¡ bqj ¡ c)qi
=
a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj
1 ¡ b2 (pi ¡ c); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Usually, social welfare, denoted by W, is measured as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and
producer surplus (PS):
W = CS + PS;











2a2 (1 ¡ b) + (p1)
2 ¡ 2bp1p2 + (p2)
2 ¡ 2a(1 ¡ b)(p1 + p2)
2(1 ¡ b2)
:
We consider the situation in which a ﬁrm’s owner decides to delegate the control of his or
her assets to a manager, similar to the case in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).
Both the ﬁrms’ owners can assess the performance of their managers according to two readily
2observable indicators–the output and proﬁt of the ﬁrm. In this case, the objective of each
manager is given by
Ui = Πi + µiqi; µi 2 R; i = 1;2;
where parameter µi measures the relevance of sales. The manager of ﬁrm i can maximize his or
her payoﬀ by choosing the output qi or the price pi that maximizes Ui (i = 1;2). This can be
supported by the assumption that the payoﬀ to the manager of ﬁrm i is represented as ¸i+¹iVi
for some real number ¸i and some positive number ¹i (i = 1;2). Similar to many existing works,
we assume that the payoﬀs to the managers are negligible as compared to proﬁts, because we
emphasize the impact of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes.
We propose the following two-stage delegation game. In the ﬁrst stage, an owner and his or
her manager bargain over the incentive parameter µi in each ﬁrm (i = 1;2). Subsequently, in
the second stage, each manager simultaneously decides his or her output or price while being
aware of the level of his or her own incentive parameter. Thus, owners and managers bargain
over their incentive parameters in the sales delegation contracts such that both their proﬁts and
payoﬀs are enhanced through their collusive market behaviors.
The bargaining in the ﬁrst stage is generally formulated in the same manner as in Binmore
et al. (1986). For each ﬁrm, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining process coincides with





i ; i = 1;2;
where ¯ 2 [0;1) denotes the measure for the relative bargaining power of the manager. Note
that in this paper, we restrict our attention to the symmetric case in which all managers have the
same bargaining powers ¯. As a result, we assume that owners select suﬃciently homogeneous
managers both in terms of their bargaining powers and the preferences to their payoﬀs. The
disagreement point of both owner and manager is zero: If the bargaining process breaks down,
the managers are unable to procure the other jobs, and the owners are unable to operate run
their ﬁrms since they do not have adequate time or managerial skills.
3 Quantity Competition
In this section, we consider how proﬁts, consumer surplus, and social welfare depend on the
relative bargaining power of the manager, ¯, for the sales delegation in the case of quantity
competition in a diﬀerentiated-products duopolistic setting.
As usual, we begin by solving the second stage. Given a pair of incentive parameters µ1 and
µ2, each manager maximizes his or her objective Ui with respect to qi (i = 1;2). The condition
for each manager is given by
@Ui
@qi
= a ¡ c ¡ 2qi ¡ bqj + µi = 0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Solving the system of the above equations for q0 and q1, we obtain the output of each ﬁrm as
follows:
qi =
a(2 ¡ b) ¡ c(2 ¡ b) + 2µi ¡ bµj
4 ¡ b2 ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
3According to the ﬁrst-order condition of the above system, we have
Ui = (qi)
2 ; Πi = (qi)
2 ¡ µiqi; i = 1;2:














2 < 0; 8b 2 (0;1); i = 1;2:
In short, similar to the results of the sales delegation case of Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), we
obtain the result that the objective function of the manager Ui is an increasing function of µi,
and the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is an concave function of µi (i = 1;2). The interests of the owner
and manager of each ﬁrm are diﬀerent. Therefore, it is appropriate for them to bargain over the
incentive parameter, µi (i = 1;2).
We now proceed to the analysis of the ﬁrst stage of the game. Considering the outcomes in











; i = 1;2:
Thus, analogous to Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for
the bargaining of each ﬁrm:
@Bi
@µi
= 0 , [2qi ¡ µi (1 + ¯)]
@qi
@µi
¡ qi (1 ¡ ¯) = 0; i = 1;2:
Taking into account that @qi=@µi = 2=
¡
4 ¡ b2¢







b2 (1 ¡ ¯) + 4¯
¤
¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)(c ¡ µ) ¡ 2bµ(1 + ¯) ¡ 4(c¯ + µ)





b2 (1 ¡ ¯) + 4¯
4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
(a ¡ c); i = 1;2:




4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)





(1 ¡ ¯) + 2c(1 + b)(1 + ¯)







(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¯)
[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]
2 (a ¡ c)
2 ; i = 1;2;
CS¤ =
4(1 + b)(1 + ¯)
2
[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]





3 ¡ ¯ + b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
¤
[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]
2 (a ¡ c)
2 :








4¯ + 2b(1 + ¯) + b2 (1 ¡ ¯)
¤
[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)
2 < 0;
48b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1); i = 1;2:
In short, the partial derivative of the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm with ¯ is negative for all








[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)







2 ¡ b2¢2 (1 ¡ ¯)
[4 + 2b(1 + ¯) ¡ b2 (1 ¡ ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)
2 > 0; 8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1):
With respect to the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare, the partial derivatives with
¯ are positive for all the values of b 2 (0;1) and ¯ 2 [0;1). The preceding results are summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. If each owner in a symmetric Cournot duopoly hires a manager who receives a
payoﬀ through the managerial incentive contract based on proﬁts and sales, and if the incentive
parameter on sales is the outcome of a bargaining process, then the corresponding delegation
game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the bargaining power ¯
of the managers. Moreover, if the bargaining power of the managers increases, the equilibrium
proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increases.
Note that similar to Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), as the measure for the relative bargaining
power of the manager ¯ approaches 1, the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm, Π¤
i approaches 0,
whereas the consumer surplus, CS¤ and social welfare, W¤ gradually increase.
4 Price Competition
In this section, we analyze the price competition case in which each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated
good. We again use backward induction and consider a two-stage process in which the owners
and managers bargain over the incentive parameter in the ﬁrst stage, and both the ﬁrms compete
with regard to prices in the second stage.
Given a pair of incentive parameters µ1 and µ2, each manager maximizes the objective func-




a(1 ¡ b) + c ¡ 2pi + bpj ¡ µi
1 ¡ b2 = 0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:





2 ¡ b ¡ b2¢
+ c(2 + b) ¡ 2µi ¡ bµj
4 ¡ b2 ; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Considering the ﬁrst-order condition of each manager, we obtain
Ui =
[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj]
2
1 ¡ b2 ;
5Πi =
[a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj][a(1 ¡ b) ¡ pi + bpj ¡ µi]
1 ¡ b2 ; i = 1;2:

















2 (1 ¡ b2)
< 0; 8b 2 (0;1); i = 1;2:
Therefore, similar to quantity competition, we ﬁnd that in price competition the objective
function of each manager Ui is an increasing function of µi, and the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is a
concave function of µi (i = 1;2).
Next, we analyze the bargaining between owners and managers in the ﬁrst stage. In the case























, a(1 ¡ b)
£
4¯ ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)
¤
¡ b3c(1 + ¯) + b2 (1 + ¯)(c + µ)






4¯ ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)
¤
4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)
(a ¡ c); i = 1;2:
We obtain the equilibrium outcomes as follows:
p¤
i =
















2 ¡ 2b ¡ b2 + b3¢¡
1 ¡ ¯2¢
(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]
2 (a ¡ c)
2 ; i = 1;2;
CS¤ =
¡
2 ¡ b2¢2 (1 + ¯)
2
(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]







2(3 ¡ ¯) ¡ 4b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)
¤
(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]
2 (a ¡ c)
2 :







2 ¡ 2b ¡ b2 + b3¢£
2b(1 ¡ ¯) + 4¯ ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)
¤
(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)
2 < 0;
8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1):
6Thus, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases for all the values of b 2 (0;1)







2 ¡ b2¢2 (1 + ¯)
(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)









(1 + b)[4 ¡ 2b(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b2 (1 + ¯)]
3 (a ¡ c)
2 > 0; 8b 2 (0;1); 8¯ 2 [0;1):
Thus, we ﬁnd that both the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare improves as the
relative bargaining power of the managers, ¯, increases in contrast to the equilibrium proﬁt of
each ﬁrm. The preceding results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If each owner in a symmetric Bertrand duopoly hires a manager who receives a
payoﬀ through the managerial delegation contract based on proﬁts and sales, and if the incentive
parameter on sales is the outcome of a bargaining process, then the corresponding delegation
game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the bargaining power ¯
of the managers. Moreover, if the bargaining power of the managers increases, the equilibrium
proﬁt of each ﬁrm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increase.
Note that analogous to quantity competition, as ¯ approaches 1, the equilibrium proﬁt of
each ﬁrm, Π¤
i approaches 0, whereas the consumer surplus, CS¤ and social welfare, W¤ gradually
increase.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the bargaining between owners and managers over managerial incentive
contracts for the sales delegation case in two types of diﬀerentiated-products markets with
Cournot and Bertrand competitions. We analyzed whether or not the results of Witteloostuijn
et al. (2007) are robust against the changes in the degree of product diﬀerentiation and/or
ﬁrms’ (managers’) strategic variables. We obtained the result that the managerial power of the
managers, ¯, is positively associated with the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare,
similar ot that in Witteloostuijn et al. (2007). Therefore, the result of the managerial delegation
game with bargaining between owners and managers is robust against such extensions.
Similar to most existing works, we assume the simultaneous-movement of both the ﬁrms
in the market stage. The interesting extension of our model is to examine whether or not
the results of this paper are robust in the case of the sequential-movement of both the ﬁrms.
Futuere research should focus on other compensation schemes, e.g., the relative proﬁt delegation
and market share delegation cases, and should conﬁrm the robustness of the results in this paper.
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